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Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: 
A Survey of the Literature
* 
 
This article considers non-unitary models of household behavior. These models suppose 
explicitly that households consist of a number of different members with preferences that are 
different from each other. They can be split up into two principal categories: cooperative (or 
collective) models, in which the allocations are supposed to be Pareto efficient; and non-
cooperative (or strategic) models which are based on the concept of Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. The demand functions that describe household behavior in these models are 
subject to constraints that differ from the traditional Slutsky conditions. In addition, in a certain 
number of specific cases, the preferences of the different household members can be 





This article presents the various approaches recently developed in economics to model the 
behavior of multi-person households. In these approaches, each member in the household is 
represented by specific, different preferences. The outcome of the decision process is then 
the result of a bargaining between household members. Importantly, the theoretical 
implications of these models differ from what is generally obtained in more traditional models 
of household behavior. In addition, in a certain number of specific cases, the preferences of 
the different household members can be identified from observable behavior. 
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* This paper is an updated translation of our paper “Les modèles non-unitaires de comportement des 
ménages: un survol de la literature”, published in Actualité économique: revue d’analyse économique. 
We are conscious that this survey does not justice to the literature that has appeared in the intervening 
three years. Men are not, when brought together, converted into another kind
of substance, with di⁄erent properties.
John Stuart Mills (1965 [1843]), Collected Works, vol.8, p.879.
1 Introduction1
1.1 The Current State of Play
In Microeconomic textbooks, household behavior, even if this household con-
sists of several di⁄erent members, is almost always analyzed using a single
household utility function, which is maximized subject to a budget constraint.
This ￿ unitary￿approach, whereby individual preferences are aggregated up
to some kind of social preference function, has the advantage of producing
testable restrictions on household behavior, and thus to allow the rigorous
empirical testing of the underlying hypotheses. For example, in the con-
text of consumer theory, the demands for goods have to be homogeneous
of degree zero, and the associated Slutsky matrix should be symmetric and
negative semi-de￿nite; moreover, demand should satisfy an ￿ income pooling￿
property, according to which only the sum of exogenous income matters for
the explanation of household behavior (and not its distribution between the
di⁄erent household members). Moreover, if these restrictions are found to
hold, household preferences can be identi￿ed via information on the complete
system of household demands. Econometricians can thus analyze the e⁄ect
of economic policy on the behavior and the welfare of the household. This
1The only bibliographic references presented in this Introduction are those which do
not appear in the remainder of the text.
3explains to a large extent the success that the unitary model has experienced
in the literature for a number of decades.
However, an analytical approach that does not take into account the mul-
tiplicity of decision makers in the household cannot be entirely satisfactory.
From a methodological point of view, the neoclassical theory of utility was
developed to describe the choices made by individuals, and not those un-
dertaken by groups such as households. Samuelson (1956) showed that a
household will act like an individual if the household members choose to
maximize a social welfare function, but this result relies on several, particu-
larly restrictive hypotheses; for instance, the presence of bargaining between
members is either ruled away, or submitted to the condition that individual
threat points or bargaining powers cannot depend on wages or individual in-
comes. Becker￿ s (1974, 1991) Rotten Kid Theorem yields a conclusion similar
to that of Samuelson, in the case where the household consists of one altruis-
tic ￿ patriarch￿and one (or more) egotistical ￿ kids￿ . This result does, however,
also pose a number of problems; for instance, Bergstrom (1989) showed that
preferences have to satisfy some very restrictive properties for the Rotten
Kid Theorem to apply.2 From an empirical point of view, the symmetry of
the Slutsky matrix has regularly been tested in this literature, either on con-
sumption or on labor supply, and almost always rejected; furthermore, the
income pooling property has equally been rejected on many occasions. Last,
in addition to these fundamental criticisms, the unitary model has shown
2Another essential condition for this theorem to hold is that the altruistic household
member has to have su¢ cient resources available in order to be able to modify her transfers
as a function of the decisions taken by other household members.
4itself to be too restrictive for the analysis of a certain number of questions,
such as intra-household inequality, economic policies which target certain
household members only, or the formation and dissolution of households.
Given both the scarcity of convincing empirical support for the unitary
model and its relative lack of theoretical foundations, a number of researchers
have developed models that are based on a non-unitary description of house-
hold decision-making.3 These models all share a basic theoretical trait: each
individual in the household has their own individual preferences. On the
contrary, a variety of di⁄erent mechanisms are appealed to in order to ex-
plain how decisions are actually taken within the household. On the one
hand, non-cooperative (strategic) models use the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
concept. Here, each individual within a household is considered to maximize
their own utility, relative to their own budget constraints, taking the actions
of other household members as given. One drawback of these models is that,
as game theory tells us, the equilibrium outcomes are typically not Pareto
e¢ cient. As such, it is generally possible, starting from this equilibrium, to
increase the welfare of one household member without reducing the welfare
of any other member. On the other hand, cooperative (or collective) models
are based on the hypothesis that the decision process within the household,
whatever that may turn out to be, produces Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes. This
category includes, in particular, models of household behavior based on the
axiomatic theory of bargaining with symmetric information (for example, the
3Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinott and Kanbur (1995) emphasize the impor-
tance of the question of the distribution of resources within the household in the context
of developing countries, and call for the development of models which allow such questions
to be taken into account.
5Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions).
The aim of the present survey is to summarize research carried out on
non-unitary models in recent years, and to update the surveys provided by
Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992), Chiappori (1997), Chiuri (2000) and Ver-
meulen (2002).4 In the following, we will mainly concentrate on cooperative
models, insisting on their empirical content, as it is with respect to these
models that the most signi￿cant theoretical advances have taken place. We
will, however, not ignore other types of models.5 Section 2 introduces the
concept of distribution factors and characterizes the demand functions that
result from cooperative models under the most general hypotheses. Section
3 introduces the question of the identi￿cation of the structural components
of the model. The question is as follows: what can we say about individ-
ual preferences and the decision process within the household when we only
observe household-level demands? Section 4 presents more speci￿c coopera-
tive models, namely those relating to labor supply and intertemporal choice
under uncertainty. This section also considers households consisting of more
than two decision-makers, and the speci￿cation of threat points in bargain-
4Lundberg and Pollak (1996) and Strauss, Mwabu and Beegle (2000) also consider
non-unitary models in their literature surveys, but are more particularly interested in the
question of the intra-household distribution of resources.
5Nonetheless, we will not present here the approaches inspired by Feminist Economics
(Folbre, 1986) or Institutional Economics (Pollak, 1985). These insist on the con￿ icts
which can occur within the household, but in a relatively non-formalized way, and even
if it is di¢ cult to deny the interest of their subject matter, the empirical content of the
models is fairly limited. We will also not consider the applications of non-unitary models
to general equilibrium (Gersbach and Haller, 2001), optimal taxation (Apps and Reese,
1988, 2009;Brett, 1998) and couple formation (Becker and Murphy, 2000).
6ing models. Section 5 then considers a certain number of results from non-
cooperative models, focussing in particular on their links with cooperative
models. A summary table of empirical estimates of these di⁄erent models is
provided in the Appendix.
1.2 Notation and De￿nitions
We consider a household consisting of two individuals, A and B. These indi-
viduals both have distinct preferences over a set of K consumption goods. In
the most general models that we will present, the goods that are purchased
serve one of three di⁄erent uses: private consumption by A, private con-
sumption by B, and public consumption. These di⁄erent uses are denoted










































and we have that:
￿ = qA + qB + Q;
where the vector ￿ = (￿
1;:::;￿
K)
0 designates the goods purchased by the
household. The household budget constraint is linear and is given by
￿
0 ￿ ￿ = y (1)
where y refers to total household spending (including when appropriate
spending on leisure) and ￿= (￿1;:::;￿K)
0 is the price vector corresponding
to ￿.
7A number of remarks can usefully be made at this point. First, some
goods may combine aspects of private and public consumption. For example,
￿telephone services ￿consist of the (public) subscription and the minutes of
conversation or other services that are used (privately) by each individual.
Next, in the context of a labor-supply model, the vector ￿ may include the
leisure of household members. This latter is typically analyzed as a private
consumption, but may also include externality aspects on the well-being of
the individual￿ s partner. Last, the econometrician does not observe in general
the use that is made of the di⁄erent goods that households purchase, and
only has information on the total demand vector ￿. As such, any theory of
household behavior, if it is to be of use to econometricians, should predict
behavior based only on the observation of this vector.6
In the most general case, we imagine that an individual￿ s preferences de-
pend not only on their own consumption, but also on that of their partner.
This situation includes certain very general forms of altruism, but also ex-
ternalities in consumption. In this case, the utility functions of household
members have the following form:7
Ui(qA;qB;Q); (2)
where Ui (￿) has the usual properties of continuity, positive monotonicity
and concavity. Under this hypothesis, any distinction between public and
6The econometrician may sometimes be able to obtain information on the private and
public components of a good. If information is also available, with respect to the private
component of the good, which part is consumed by A and which by B, the good is called
￿assignable￿ . This situation is, however, exceptional.
7In the remainder of the text, the index i will refer indiscriminately to agent A or B.
8private consumption is purely arti￿cial. For some applications, however,
it will be necessary to introduce stronger hypotheses regarding preferences.
For example, if agents are egotistical, and in the absence of externalities,
individual preferences can be written as
Ui(qi;Q): (3)
An intermediary situation between the types described by (2) and (3) comes
from altruistic (caring) agents, in Becker￿ s sense, in an environment without
externalities. Preferences can then be written as:
Ui(uA(qA;Q);uB(qB;Q)): (4)
This de￿nition is close to the notion of pure altruism that is found in the
economic literature on the subject.
A number of the distinctions that we can make refer to the nature of
the goods rather than to individuals￿preferences. Consider, for example,
some good k. In the case without externalities, we can imagine the following
situations:
(a) good k is (purely) private if Qk = 0;
(b) good k is (purely) public if (qk
A + qk
B) = 0.
In what follows, we will sometimes consider the speci￿c cases where either
all goods are private or all goods are public.8 We will also examine the
case where each good is either purely private or purely public. If we let
8Note that, if all goods are public, the distinction between altruistic and egotistical
agents disappears.
9q = qA + qB denote the household￿ s demand for private goods, then this
formally means that
Q ￿ q = 0;
where ￿ is the Hadamard product (i.e., the element-by-element product).
In this case, we say that the public and private goods are disjoint, and we
designate the prices of private and public goods respectively by the vectors
p and P. For reasons which will become clear below, the vector p is of
dimension K and contains zeros instead of prices for public goods. The
vector P is de￿ned similarly, so that we have ￿ = p + P.
If some good is consumed by one person only in the household, the dis-
tinction between public and private good loses its meaning, and, in this case,
we prefer to talk about exclusive goods. Note that this property of exclu-
sivity is more a characteristic of preferences than of the good itself. For
example, cigarettes are generally considered as a private good (if we exclude
any resulting externalities), but if one of the household members does not
smoke, then cigarettes will be classi￿ed as an exclusive good. These types of
goods are often encountered by the econometrician in household survey data
on consumption. A typical example, which is often given, is that of cloth-
ing when this is sexually di⁄erentiated. Another example, which is more
debatable, is that of the leisure of di⁄erent household members.
The presence of exclusive goods in the household is often necessary for us
to be able to understand the mechanisms which determine the allocation of
resources. This aspect will be made clearer in the remainder of the article,
but we can note at this preliminary stage that the quantity of an exclusive
good consumed by an individual is a guide as to the distribution of decision
10power in the household. The intuition, if exclusive goods are superior, is
that their consumption will be greater as the decision power of the person to
whom that good is associated is larger.
2 Cooperative Models ￿ General Theory
2.1 The Demand for Goods
As we noted in the Introduction, cooperative models are based on the sole
hypothesis that the household decision process leads to Pareto-e¢ cient out-
comes. However, the actual process which determines the household￿ s equi-
librium outcome on the e¢ ciency frontier is not necessarily speci￿ed. In
principle, this process could be a function of any kind of variable which
re￿ ects the household environment. Some of these variables, called ￿distri-
bution factors￿ , play a particularly important role as they will a⁄ect the
decision process within the household without a⁄ecting preferences or the
budget constraint.9 Numerous examples of such variables can be found in
Household Economics and Development Economics. For example, Lundberg,
Pollak and Wales (1997) analyze the e⁄ects on the structure of consumption
of a change, in the United Kingdom in the 1970s, in the bene￿ciary of child
support. They notably demonstrate that this change in recipient had an ef-
fect on the demand for children￿ s clothing.10 Along the same lines, Thomas,
9Distribution factors are similar to the extra-environmental parameters (EEPs) in the
terminology of McElroy (1990, 1997).
10A number of other contributions have con￿rmed this type of result by showing, in the
context of testing the income-pooling condition, that the share of each individual in total
exogenous income a⁄ects households￿decisions. A non-exhaustive list of this kind of work
11Contreras and Frankenberg (2004) appeal to Indonesian data to underline
that the distribution of income at the time of marriage has an impact on the
subsequent health of the children. In addition, Rubalcava and Thomas (2005)
show that changes in the amount of support to single women with children
(AFDC) in the USA has an e⁄ect on the consumption and labor supply of
couples with children. Du￿ o (2000) has derived related conclusions from a
careful analysis of a reform of the South African social pension program that
extended the bene￿ts to a large, previously not covered black population.
She ￿nds that the recipient￿ s gender - a typical distribution factor - is of
considerable importance for the consequences of the transfers on children￿ s
health. The analysis in Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), inspired by the
work of Becker (1991), considers marriage market indicators and marriage
legislation in the USA. They ￿nd that these variables in￿ uence the labor sup-
ply of American households.11 Equally, Ore¢ cce (2007) analyzes the e⁄ect
of the legalization of abortion on the labor supply of American households.
Last, Folbre (1997) provides numerous additional examples based on certain
legislative aspects (the right of women to possess land, to participate in the
labor market, to be protected against domestic violence, etc).
Suppose that agents￿preferences have the general form (2) and that the
includes Behrman (1988), Thomas (1990, 1992, 1994), Schultz (1990), Phipps and Burton
(1992), Haddad and Hoddinott (1994), Du￿ o (2000), Kooreman (2000), and Lechene and
Attanassio (2002). In particular, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko⁄ (1992) consider the cadre
of the extended family, while Klassen (1998) and Moehling (2005) appeal to historical
data.
11Similar conclusions are reached with di⁄erent data by Gray (1998), Moreau and Donni
(2002) and Grossbard-Schechtman and Neuman (2003).
12J distribution factors which are pertinent for the problem at hand are desig-
nated by s= (s1;:::;sJ)
0. In an attractive representation, the Pareto-e¢ cient
solution can be obtained from the maximization of a utilitarian social wel-
fare function with appropriate weights.12 This thus implies that there exists




￿(y;￿;s) ￿ UA(qA;qB;Q) + (1 ￿ ￿(y;￿;s)) ￿ UB(qA;qB;Q) (5)
subject to constraint (1). The function ￿(y;￿;s) can be interpreted as an
index of the distribution of power within the household. If ￿ = 0, the prefer-
ences of B are imposed dictatorially in the household, and A has no decision-
making power. If, on the contrary, ￿ = 1, it is A￿ s preferences which are
imposed. We imagine that in general ￿(y;￿;s) is a continuous function (and
di⁄erentiable to boot) and homogeneous of degree zero in y and ￿.
As we can see, the cooperative approach is characterized by the max-
imization of a function. Even so, and contrary to the unitary case, this
function cannot be interpreted as a traditional utility function as it depends
on income, prices, and the distribution factors.13 The demands that result
from the programme (5) will not in general exhibit the habitual properties of
Marshallian demand functions (Pollak, 1977). However, it can be noted that
12More generally, any Pareto e¢ cient solution can be obtained as the solution of an




subject to constraint (1), where W (￿) is a function increasing in its ￿rst two arguments.
13See Browning, Chiappori and LechŁne 2006 for a detailed discussion.
13if the function ￿ is ￿xed, then programme (5) boils down to the maximization
of a utility function. This implies, in other words, that household demands
can be written as follows:
qi = qi(￿;y;￿(y;￿;s));
Q = Q(￿;y;￿(y;￿;s)):
where the qi (￿;￿) and Q(￿;￿) functions satisfy the Slutsky conditions for a
￿xed level of ￿. In addition, in accordance with Hicks￿aggregation theorem,
the aggregated demands, de￿ned by
￿ =
P
i=A;B qi(￿;y;￿(y;￿;s)) + Q(￿;y;￿(y;￿;s)) (6)
= ￿(￿;y;￿(y;￿;s));
will also satisfy the Slutsky conditions for a ￿xed value of ￿. Last, note
that the distribution factors s in￿ uence household choices uniquely via the
￿ function.
Household demands thus naturally exhibit certain characteristic proper-
ties. In addition to the trivial property of homogeneity of degree zero, we
can also single out the conditions of SR(1), linearity and proportionality.
Further, under additional hypotheses over preferences or goods, household
demands will also satisfy more restrictive conditions.
142.2 The Characterization of Household Demands14
2.2.1 The Symmetric Negative plus Rank 1 or SNR(1) Condition
We de￿ne, analogously to the model of the consumer in the unitary case, the








Browning and Chiappori (1998) then show that the household demands that
are compatible with problem (5) have to satisfy the following restriction:
S = ￿ + R; (7)
where ￿ is a negative symmetric semi-de￿nite matrix and R is a matrix of
rank 1. This equation can be interpreted geometrically if we note that, for
any pair of utility functions: (a) the budget constraint determines the Pareto
frontier, as a function of prices and income; and (b) the value of ￿ determines
the location of the point that will be chosen by the household along that fron-
tier. Consequently, any change in prices or income will displace the Pareto
frontier. This displacement will lead to a change in household demands in
the way described by ￿. However, the value of ￿ will change at the same
time. This second e⁄ect, which is restricted to movements along the Pareto
frontier, is de￿ned by the matrix R. In fact, the SNR(1) condition is restric-
tive for household demands which satisfy the homogeneity and adding-up
conditions as long as the number of goods K is greater or equal to 3.15 Chi-
14In what follows, we only consider local restrictions. The reader is referred to Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2007) and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008) for global analysis.
15Three goods are su¢ cient for negativeness to be restrictive, while ￿ve are needed for
symmetry.
15appori and Ekeland (2006) show, in the case where there are no distribution
factors, that this condition is also locally su¢ cient. In other words, for any
system of demands which satis￿es the condition (7) in the neighborhood of
some vector (￿0
￿;y￿), there exists at least one pair of utility functions and a
function ￿ such that the demand system is the solution to programme (5) in
the neighborhood under consideration.16
A speci￿c procedure needs to be followed for empirical tests to be carried
out. The principle of this procedure is based on the fact that the matrix S
will be SNR(1) if and only if the antisymmetric matrix (S ￿ S
0) is of rank 2 at
most. The procedure is then to estimate a system of demands, to calculate
the matrix (S ￿ S
0), and to test the rank of this matrix by appealing to
existing techniques; see Robin and Smith (2000) for example. This test was
carried out on Canadian data by Browning and Chiappori (1998). A system
of demands for seven goods was estimated on a sample of couples without
children, to show that the traditional condition of symmetry is rejected, while
that of SR1 is not. Moreover, as the condition of symmetry is not rejected
for single people, it would seem that not taking the multiplicity of decision
makers into account in the household could explain the empirical rejection
of unitary models.
16Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) also consider the implications of more restrictive hy-
potheses over goods, such as goods being only private, only public, or where all goods are
disjoint. They show, perhaps surprisingly, that the SR(1) condition remains su¢ cient.
162.2.2 The Conditions of Colinearity and Proportionality
Additional restrictions come into play as soon as we introduce distribution
factors. In the ￿rst instance, consider that there is only one distribution
factor, s. Browning and Chiappori (1998) then show that there exists a
vector u such that:
@￿
@s
= (S ￿ S
0) ￿ u.
This is a restrictive condition due to the fact that, as discussed above, the
matrix S￿S0 is of rank 2 at most. We thus obtain a surprising result, where
the e⁄ect of a distribution factor on demand is colinear to the e⁄ect of prices.
When there are at least two distribution factors, the demands have to
satisfy an additional property that is particularly useful as it can be tested
using cross-section data and does not require price e⁄ects to be evaluated.
This property re￿ ects the fact that distribution factors in￿ uence the demand







where ￿j = (@￿=@s1)=(@￿=@sj) is a scalar. In other words, the vectors
of response of demands to a change in the various distribution factors are








This proportionality condition has now been tested in a wide variety of
settings. We present only two examples. Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori
and Lechene (1993) estimate a system of six demand equations using French
17data, retaining the share of female and male labor earnings in total household
income as distribution factors. Thomas and Chen (1994) appeal to the same
distribution factors in their estimation of a system of ten demand equations
in Taiwanese data. In both of these pieces of work, and more remarkably in
the majority of empirical work, the proportionality condition is not rejected.
2.2.3 Particular Conditions
The restrictions discussed above are general in the sense that they result
only from the hypothesis of Pareto e¢ ciency. However, more restrictive con-
ditions result from the adoption of particular hypotheses regarding goods or
preferences.
For reasons that will become clear in the following section, the cases
of preferences that are given by a utility function such as (3) and where
the goods, public or private, are disjoint has been the subject of particular
interest in the profession. Under these hypotheses, Chiappori (1992), and
numerous other authors since, showed that the household decision process
can be composed into two stages. First, the household members agree on
the consumption of public goods, and on the sharing of the sum to be spent
on private goods. They then each maximize independently their utilities
taking into account the level of public goods and their own personal budget
constraint. Formally, this implies that there exist a pair of functions, ￿A and
￿B, such that ￿A + ￿B = y￿, where y￿ = y ￿ P
0Q is household spending on
private goods, such that the demand for private goods of individual i, qi, is
given by the solution to
max
qi
Ui(qi;Q) such that p
0qi = ￿i:
18The functions, ￿A and ￿B, describe the distribution of power in the household
(for a given level of public goods) and depend on the variables y;p;Q and s.
Consequently, the demands for private goods can be written as:
q = qA(p;Q;￿(y;p;Q;s)) + qB(p;Q;y
￿ ￿ ￿(y;p;Q;s)); (8)
where ￿ = ￿A and y￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿B, and where the functions qA (￿) and qB (￿)
are Marshallian demands conditional on Q in the sense of Pollak (1969) or
Browning and Meghir (1991). This structure produces particular restrictions
on household behavior as the same function ￿ appears in all of the demands.
Compared to equation (6), the distribution factors now have an income e⁄ect
through the sharing rule. In addition, Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiap-
pori (2009) derive particular constraints, in the form of partial di⁄erential
equations, which private demands need to satisfy in the particular case where
prices are constant. They also show that a minimum of three separate de-
mands are in general necessary for household behavior to be constrained.
The question of the allocation of public goods has only been treated
more recently in the literature.17 In particular, Donni (2009) shows that the
(inverse) demands for public goods have to have a fairly comparable structure
to those for private goods. The demands for public goods are thus implicitly
de￿ned as follows:
P = P A(p;Q;￿(y;p;Q;s)) + P B(p;Q;y
￿ ￿ ￿(y;p;Q;s)); (9)
where the functions P A (￿) and P B (￿) denote the individual prices (that is,
the Lindahl prices) at which the household members value the public goods,
17A preliminary analysis of the constraints due to the presence of public goods was
carried out by Chiuri and Simmons (1997).
19and ￿ as previously.
To conclude, the demands for exclusive goods can be written in an anal-
ogous manner whether the good be public or private. Imagine that good 1,
for example, is exclusively consumed by household member i. If the econo-
metrician considers that this is an exclusive public good, its inverse demand





where p1 = 0 and ￿i do not include expenditure on good 1 (as good 1 is a
public good). However, the exclusive good is most often considered to be





where Q1 = 0 and ￿i now include the expenditure on good 1 (as good 1 is
a private good). The most important point here is that the demands for
public and private goods by one household member do not depend on the
price of the exclusive goods consumed by his or her partner ￿ except via the
sharing rule. We can thus show that the presence of these goods produces
greater restrictions, which are formally derived in a series of theoretical con-
tributions including, amongst others, Chiappori (1988, 1992), Bourguignon,
Browning and Chiappori (2009), Donni (2007), and Chiappori, Fortin and
Lacroix (2002).
2.3 Conditional Demands
In the context of collective models, one type of conditional demand is of
particular interest. Consider, for example, the demand for good k, denoted
20by ￿
k, and suppose that this demand can be locally inverted with respect to





where s￿1 is the vector of distribution factors with the ￿rst element removed.
The substitution of this function into the demands for the goods k0 6= k yields






These demands, known as ￿s-conditional demands￿ , turn out to be very
useful as a way of expressing the di⁄erent constraints due to Pareto e¢ ciency.
For example, Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009) show that the







In what follows, we will refer to ￿implicit proportionality￿ to make clear
that this condition applies to the conditional demands. Donni (2006) equally
derives an implicit transposition of the SR1 condition with a set of additional
hypotheses over preferences and goods, while Donni and Moreau (2007) adapt
s-conditional demands to the question of labor supply.
There are other ways in which demands can be usefully expressed in the
collective framework. Donni (2009), as does Mazzocco (2004) in a some-
what di⁄erent context, considers a form of demands where the good under
consideration is a function of the demands for two goods. These represent
the distribution factors s and income y. These demands, known as ￿cm-
demands￿ , are valuable for the analysis of cooperative models, in particular
21if we suppose that agents are egotistical and that the conditioning goods are
exclusive.
3 Cooperative Models ￿ Identi￿cation
This section asks the following question: given that household demands are
observed, what can we say about the structural components of the decision
process that led to them, that is, the utility functions and the function ￿?
This question has been answered in a number of di⁄erent ways in the recent
literature. Indeed, rather than a general theory of identi￿cation, the litera-
ture has provided a scattered set of results based on particular hypotheses. In
the following we will attempt to present the most important of these results.
As a preliminary, we should note that in a general model where the pref-
erences are given by equation (2), it is simply not possible to identify the
decision process.18 Additional hypotheses over goods or preferences are nec-
essary for identi￿cation to be feasible. In the following, we thus imagine that
preferences are as given in equation (3) and that public and private goods
are disjoint. We consider ￿rst of all the case where all goods are private, and
then afterwards all of the other cases.
3.1 The Case of Private Goods Only
As noted above, under the preceding hypotheses, Pareto e¢ ciency has one
attractive consequence: that of being able to split the decision process up
into two stages. Without public goods, the demands for private goods can
18A formal proof of this statement is provided in Chiappori and Ekeland (2009).
22then be written as follows:
q = qA(p;￿(y;p;s)) + qB(p;y ￿ ￿(y;p;s)): (12)
When all goods are private, the decentralization of the decision-making
process can be seen as a simple corollary of the Second Fundamental Theo-
rem of Welfare Economics. Moreover, the relationship between the functions
￿(y;p;s) and ￿(y;p;s) is bijective, so that these functions are equivalent
representations of the distribution of power within the household. Even so,
the representation in terms of the sharing rule is often preferable, as it is
invariant to a positive monotonic transformation of the utility functions.
Nonetheless, the sharing rule no longer constitutes an adequate measure of
the distribution of power as soon as some of the goods are public ￿ even
though it still exists in this case, as we saw in the preceding section.
When all goods are private, Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009)
show that some derivatives of the sharing rule can be identi￿ed from observed
behavior. More precisely:19
Proposition 1 If a set of three demands for three goods is observed, and if
K > 4 and J > 1, the sharing rule ￿ is identi￿ed up to a function k (p); this
function is homogeneous of degree 1 in p.
In other words, if the sharing rule ￿￿(y;p;s) is compatible with a set of three
private goods demands, then any other rule ￿(y;p;s) which is compatible
19Our objective in the following propositions is to set out a number of the main identi-
￿cation results. However, all of these results require regularity conditions, sometimes very
complex, that it would be too tedious to list here. Information on these is available in the
cited articles.
23with the same set of demands will necessarily have the following form:
￿(y;p;s) = ￿
￿(y;p;s) + k(p)
where k(p) is a linear homogeneous function. In particular, if prices do
not change, which will in principle be the case in cross-section data, this
indetermination then boils down to a constant. Note that the identi￿cation
of the derivatives of the sharing rule does not require the observation of
demands at the individual level. The mechanism of resource-sharing within
the household can be analyzed via the estimation of a system of demands.
In certain situations, it is possible to reduce this indetermination regard-
ing the function k(￿). To this end, the econometrician needs information on
one or more exclusive goods. Suppose that good 1 (resp. 2) is exclusively
consumed by member A (resp. B). From equation (11), we know that the








B(p2;p￿2;y ￿ ￿(y;p;s)); (14)
where p￿2 denotes the vector of prices p with its ￿rst two elements removed.
Some simple manipulations of these equations shows that the indi⁄erence
curves of the sharing rule can be recovered. If we consider equation (13), for

























where the terms on the right-hand side are observable; we can carry out an
analogous procedure in the case of (14). This information on the sharing
24rule is invaluable, and as a result the identi￿cation of the sharing rule from
exclusive goods is in general more robust.
In more detail, Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) and Chiappori, Fortin and
Lacroix (2002) prove the following result:
Proposition 2 If the demands for goods 1 and 2 are observed, and good 1
(resp. 2) is exclusively consumed by member A (resp. B), and if J > 1, the
sharing rule ￿ is identi￿ed up to a function p￿2; this function is homogeneous
of degree 1 in p￿2.
In other words, the derivative of the sharing rule with respect to the price of
exclusive goods can be identi￿ed. Furthermore, we only need to observe the
demands for two goods, as opposed to three in the preceding case. Chiappori
(1988, 1992) shows that distribution factors are not totally indispensable for
identi￿cation. These do however produce more robust identi￿cation and are
necessary if we consider the price of exclusive goods to be constant.
These theoretical results have inspired a substantial empirical literature.
For example, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) con-
sider a theoretical framework where prices are constant, and estimate the
sharing rule on Canadian data under the hypothesis that male and female
clothing are exclusive goods. They show that the sharing of household re-
sources is a function of the labour earnings of husband and wife. Other
authors, whose work will be described in more detail below, use these theo-
retical results in the context of labor supply, where leisure is considered to
be an exclusive good. Finally, Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009)
and Donni (2006) consider the theoretical case where the econometrician
25only observes one exclusive good, and an aggregated good, and reach similar
conclusions to those in propositions 1 and 2.
3.2 The Case of Public Goods Only
The literature on the possibility of identifying the structural elements of
household behavior when consumption is public is only recent. When the
econometrician observes demands for two exclusive goods, Chiappori and
Ekeland (2009), and Donni (2009) with another proof technique, prove the
following powerful result.
Proposition 3 If a complete system of demands is observed and good 1
(resp. 2) is exclusively consumed by member A (resp. B), the utility func-
tions are identi￿ed up to a monotone transformation. For any choice of
cardinalization, the ￿ function is exactly identi￿ed.
As such, all the structural components of the model are identi￿able, and this
identi￿cation is not conditional on an unknown constant. This result does
not depend on distribution factors. On the contrary, we do need to observe
the complete system of demands to recuperate the utility functions, but this
is also the case in the unitary model.
3.3 The General Case of private and public goods
If some goods are private and others public, the identi￿cation question be-
comes much more complicated and there is no general solution to the problem
at time of writing. Some important components of the structural model can
26however be identi￿ed. To show this, we de￿ne the ￿collective￿indirect util-
ity functions v￿
i(y;p;P;s) by substituting demand functions for private and




This expression describes the level of welfare that member i attains in the
household when he or she faces the price-income bundle (p;P;y) and a set
of distribution factors s. This representation of utility di⁄ers from the ￿uni-
tary￿indirect utility function in that it implicitly includes an outcome of the
collective decision process. In the case where certain private goods are con-
sumed exclusively by one or the other of the household members, Chiappori
and Ekeland (2009) proves the following result:
Proposition 4 If a complete system of demands for goods is observed, and
private good 1 (resp. 2) is exclusively consumed by member A (resp. B), the
indirect collective utility functions are identi￿ed up to a monotonic transfor-
mation. For any choice of cardinalization, the ￿ function is exactly identi￿ed.
This result is important because it gives us the opportunity to carry out well-
being analysis, not at the household but at the individual level. Blundell,
Chiappori and Meghir (2005) propose a similar analysis with respect to labor
supply (see below). Donni (2006) show that the indirect collective utility
function can be identi￿ed, using the observation of only one exclusive good,
in the case where all goods are private.
273.4 Single People￿ s Preferences and the Behavior of
Married Couples
In the work described above, one of the principal di¢ culties comes from the
fact that individual preferences are unknown, and have to be estimated from
behavior (at the same time as the Pareto weights). One possible solution is
to appeal to other sources of information to estimate preferences. In prac-
tice, this most often consists in the use of data on single people to estimate
individual preferences, and then to use the results of these estimations in the
analysis of couple behavior, which allows us in general to identify exactly
the decision process. A general presentation of this procedure is contained
in Laisney (eds, 2006).
The identi￿cation of household decision-making from the behavior of sin-
gle people does of course raise a number of particular problems. In the ￿rst
instance, there is obviously the danger of selection bias, in the sense that the
marriage decision will likely depend on preferences. To avoid this stumbling
block, it is useful to have panel data available in which the same individuals
are followed over time and are observed at di⁄erent periods both as single or
divorced, and married. Recent work by Couprie (2007) appeals to this idea
to analyze labor supply in the context of domestic production, which we will
return to below.
Even if the correction bias is corrected, other problems remain. We know,
for example, that the consumption structure of couples is qualitatively dif-
ferent from that of singles (￿one and one don￿ t make two￿ , to cite the title
of an article by Vermeulen and Watteyne, 2006). Browning, Chiappori and
Lewbel (2006) propose a solution which avoids supposing that preferences
28change (in good methodological practice, changes in preferences are only in-
voked as a last resort). It is supposed that individual preferences remain
the same whatever the marital status, but introduce the Beckerian idea of
a domestic production technology which is particular to couples ￿ either
because the consumption of certain goods is associated with economies of
scale, or more generally because the complementarity or substitutability be-
tween goods might be di⁄erent for couples. They show that for a general
linear technology it is possible to identify all of the structural elements of
the model (both the decision-making process and the production technology)
when estimating the demands of the single and couples. These methods have
the additional advantage of supplying a new and probably more operational
de￿nition of the concept of an equivalence scale.20
4 Cooperative Models ￿ Applications and
Extensions
4.1 Labor Supply Models
Labor supply models are amongst the oldest to have appealed to the coop-
erative approach, having started at the beginning of the 1980s.21 In these
models, the leisure of household members is typically considered as an exclu-
sive good, while the other goods, which are of only secondary importance,
20See also Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) on this.
21The ￿rst contributions to the cooperative theory of labor supply include, amongst
others, Apps (1981, 1982), Apps and Jones (1986), and Apps and Rees (1988). This
research was in general based on less general hypotheses than those used in later work.
29are aggregated into a Hicksian good with a price that is supposed equal to
one.22
Labor supply models are distinctive in the ￿rst instance by the hypothe-
ses that are made with respect to the nature of the goods and the form of
preferences. If consumption is private, and if agents are egotistical, the utility
functions can be written as follows:
Ui(T ￿ hi;qi);
where hi denotes the labor supply of member i, qi their private consumption,
and T total available time. The price of leisure of member i, in other words
their hourly wage, is denoted by wi. As we saw above, the decision process
can be decentralized. In the ￿rst stage, household members receive an equal
allocation of ￿i, with ￿A + ￿B = y, where y designates the net spending of
the household (i.e. total spending, including spending on leisure, from which
the value of the time endowment, TwA +TwB, is subtracted). In the second
stage, each individual maximizes their utility without taking their partner￿ s
behavior into account. In this case, labor supplies are of the following form:
hi = hi(wi;￿i(y;wA;wB;s)): (15)
It is to be noted here that the labor supply of individual i depends only on
her own wage and her endowment, in particular, the wage and endowment
of her partner play a part only via the sharing rule.
The identi￿cation results presented above can be readily applied here. It
is clear, from proposition 2, that the sharing rule can be identi￿ed up to a
22This last seems like a natural hypothesis as, in labor-supply models, the consumption
price is generally considered to be constant.
30constant (as the price of the aggregate good is constant). Moreover, proposi-
tion 4 implies that the collective indirect utility function can be retrieved as
well. This gives us the opportunity to carry out well-being analysis, not at
the household but at the individual level. Last, note that the identi￿cation of
the sharing rule does not require any distribution factors here; the presence
of these latter will nonetheless produce more robust estimation results.
The theory of cooperative models of labor supply is extended by Donni
(2003) to include the treatment of corner solutions and non-linear budget
constraints. In addition, Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir (2007)
consider the situation where female labor supply is continuous whereas male
labor supply is discrete, and show that the sharing rule can equally be re-
covered in this case. Last, a great number of empirical applications have
appealed to the theoretical framework developed above. Fortin and Lacroix
(1997) use Canadian data to test the constraints of the model: the results
show that these are rejected for a sample of couples without children. They
also estimate the parameters of the sharing rule, but these are not estimated
particularly precisely. Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) appeal to data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and obtain much more precise
estimates of the structural parameters. One of the reasons for this greater
precision is their introduction of appropriate distribution factors into the
analysis, in this case variables relating to the marriage market and the leg-
islation of marriage. Moreau and Donni (2002) also introduce distribution
factors, applied to French data, and take into account the non-linearity of
taxation. Other empirical analyses in the same vein include Bloemen (2009),
Clark, Couprie and Sofer (2004) and Vermeulen (2005) on Dutch, British
31and Belgian data respectively.
The hypothesis on the private nature of consumption can easily be re-
laxed. For example, Donni (2007) consider egotistical individuals with the
following preferences:
Ui(T ￿ hi;Q);
where Q is a Hicksian good which represents public consumption. Under
this hypothesis, and taking into account the property of homogeneity, labor













y + hAwA + hBwB
denotes member i￿ s Lindahl price for the public good. Proposition 3, adapted
to the case of labor supply, implies that the utility functions are identi￿ed
up to a positive transformation.
A wide variety of other models of labor supply have recently been pro-
posed.23 Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005) have developed a model
where consumption consists of a public good and a private good. The utility
functions then are of the following form:
Ui(li;qi;Q):
Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir then advance that the collective indirect
utility functions can be identi￿ed up to a positive transformation. This result
23We do not discuss below those which are inspired by the theory of revealed preferences;
see Chiappori (1988) and Seaton (1997, 2000) on this subject.
32is a variation of proposition 4. However, to facilitate identi￿cation, they use
a distribution factor.
In addition, Fong and Zhang (2001) question the idea that leisure is an
exclusive good and adopt a novel approach to the problem. They imagine
that leisure can be decomposed into private leisure (that agents use inde-
pendently from each other) and public leisure (that agents enjoy together).
Preferences have a separable structure and are written as follows:
Ui(ui(li;qi);L);
where L denotes public leisure and li private leisure. The important point in
their analysis is that, in general, the econometrician only observes the total
leisure of each member, that is ‘i = li + L. It can then be shown that, with
the help of exclusive goods and distribution factors, that the two components
of leisure can be identi￿ed. This result is of particular interest as it shows
how the identi￿cation question can be treated in the case where public and
private goods are not disjoint.
4.2 Domestic Production
One natural generalization of the above models is to include domestic pro-
duction. Apps and Rees (1997), Chiappori (1997), and then Donni (2008),
all suppose that preferences also cover the consumption of a good which is
produced within the household. The utility functions then have the following
form:
Ui(li;qi;zi);
33where zi is produced with the technology:
zA + zB = F(tA;tB);
where F is a constant ￿or decreasing ￿returns to scale production function,
and ti is the time devoted by household member i to domestic production. If
domestic labor supplies, as well as market labor supplies, are observed, and
the domestic good is tradeable, then identi￿cation of preferences and the
sharing rule does not pose any particular problem. However, if the domestic
good is not tradeable, so that its price is endogenous to the household deci-
sions, identi￿cation raises problems which have not yet been entirely solved.
This model, and variants of it, have been empirically analyzed in a num-
ber of contributions. For example, Apps and Rees (1996), Rapoport, Sofer
and Solaz (2004) and van Klaveren, van Praag and Maassen van den Brink
(2007) estimate the canonical model with Australian, French and Dutch data,
respectively. Couprie (2003) considers a model where the domestic good is
public, and presents empirical results from British data. Udry (1996) takes a
radically di⁄erent approach to test e¢ ciency in a sample of rural households
where Agricultural production is carried out using di⁄erent plots of land.
Productive e¢ ciency here requires that domestic labor supplies are deter-
mined such that average productivity is the same for all of the plots of land
that the household cultivates, independently of the identity of the individual
who owns the plot. This condition is tested and rejected using data from
Burkina Faso.
344.3 Choice under Uncertainty
Once we accept that households need to be analyzed as a group of individ-
uals, rather than as a single decision-making center, any situation involving
uncertainty should be considered in the framework of risk-sharing within the
household. This type of analysis raises a number of interesting problems.
First, we can consider the conditions under which a household will behave,
as seen from the outside, like a single decision-maker. The work of Wilson
(1968), extended by Mazzocco (2005), shows that an exact aggregation of this
type is only possible under restrictive conditions: technically, risk aversion
has to be of the ￿harmonic risk-aversion￿(HARA) type, with in addition the
same coe¢ cient for all of the household members (ISHARA).24 If this is not
the case, then the analysis of the sharing of risk within the household is com-
plex. Mazzocco shows that an increase in the risk aversion of one individual
can reduce the risk aversion exhibited by the group.
We may, in addition, try to measure the extent of risk-sharing within the
household. This was the subject of a great deal of research in the past (see
Hayashi, Altonji and Kotliko⁄, 1996, for example), the principal implication
of e¢ ciency in this context is well-known: when exogenous income is subject

















35to random ￿ uctuations, the consumption of any one individual should not
be a⁄ected by their own individual risk, but only by the aggregate risk.
This ￿mutuality principle￿ has been applied on a number of occasions to
the problem of risk-sharing in rural villages in developing countries, starting
with the contribution of Townsend (1994). To apply these results at the
household level, however, requires that we face the traditional problem of the
non-observation of individual consumption levels. Chiappori (1999) tackles
this problem by extending the existing results to the situation where agents
are able to adjust their labor supply in response to random shocks. He
then shows that labor supplies should then depend only on total exogenous
household income, and not on variations in its components due to random
shocks. In other words, the income aggregation condition holds in a collective
model with uncertainty. In addition, the sharing rule which results from the
sharing of risk between household members has to satisfy a restriction with
takes the form of a partial di⁄erential equation. This model has not to date
been estimated empirically. However, Dercon and Krishnan (2000) is also on
the subject of risk-sharing, and presents results from Ethiopian data. The
underlying idea in this paper is to use a measure of health, which is observed
at the individual level, to pick up the e⁄ect of shocks on incomes.
4.4 Intertemporal Choice
These di¢ culties are also found in collective models of intertemporal con-
sumption,25 but we have in addition a more fundamental problem: a poten-
25Browning (1995, 2000) was among the ￿rst contributions to analyze intertemporal
choice in the context of a collective model. He also emphasizes the di⁄erent problems that
36tial challenge to the paradigm of Pareto e¢ ciency, at least in its strongest
sense. This latter supposes that household members are able to commit to
long-term engagements; technically, the Pareto weights are invariant over
time, and independent of any shocks which hit the household. This is a
strong hypothesis, particularly in a context where divorce is possible (and
agents cannot commit not to divorce). Recent work has however suggested
￿rst a way of empirically testing the validity of this hypothesis, and second
a more general formulation of the problem which allows this hypothesis to
be relaxed.
Technically, if risk-sharing is e¢ cient, and if utility functions are intertem-























under a stochastic intertemporal budget constraint, where ! is the state of na-
ture, ￿ is the discount rate, and qt
i(!) is the consumption of household mem-
ber i in period t in state !. The strongest form of e¢ ciency (full-commitment
e¢ ciency) implies that no renegotiation of a pre-existing agreement take
place. The function ￿ is then ￿xed at the beginning of the planning horizon,
taking into account the full set of characteristics of the distribution of prices
and incomes (represented by the parameter vector ￿), and remains constant
over the entire life cycle. A weaker form of e¢ ciency (limited-commitment
e¢ ciency) consists of supposing that participation constraints are satis￿ed
at each time period and for each state of nature. Formally, this yields a series
are encountered in such estimations.













for all ￿ > 0 and all !, where ￿ U
t+￿
i (￿;!) are utility thresholds.26
Recent work has looked at the theoretical properties of this model. Maz-
zocco (2005) considers the allocation of consumption over two periods, and
notably produces a paradoxical result: everything else equal, risk-sharing
within the household may produce a higher level of saving, even when the
individual utility function have all of the standard properties (prudence etc.).
Again, this paradox only disappears if preferences are of the ￿ISHARA￿type.
Mazzocco (2007) shows that, in households with more than one individual,
the Euler equation, which describes the intertemporal allocation of consump-
tion, will in general depend on the distribution of bargaining power, that is
of the Pareto weights.27 Here again, household behavior can be described
by a traditional Euler equation (corresponding to a unitary utility function
U(qt
A + qt
B)) only if preferences are ISHARA. When this is not the case, any
parameter which a⁄ects the Pareto weights will also have an impact on the
26Basu (2006) considers a di⁄erent type of ine¢ ciency in the intertemporal context, due
to current actions a⁄ecting future bargaining power; this endogenization of the Pareto
weights may provide an incentive for certain households not to exploit all of the potential
e¢ ciency gains. Lundberg and Pollak (2003) continue with this idea, with an example
based on the location choice of the couple, and insist on the role of particular decisions
which may change the stationary character of the household￿ s environment. These inef-
￿ciencies disappear once we allow household members to commit contractually. Further
contributions in the same vein are Konrad and Lommerud (2000) and Lundberg (2002).
27Lich-Tyler (2001, 2003) also considers Euler equations in the framework of an in-
tertemporal model, and reaches similar conclusions.
38Euler equations, even if all of the other properties of the model (perfect ￿-
nancial markets, rational expectations, etc.) are satis￿ed. As a result, the
classic test of intertemporal behavior, that the marginal expected utility of
future consumption depend only on current marginal utility (and not on the
current values of other variables, such as incomes) will be in general inap-
propriate in the case of household data, at least in the case, which is likely
true, that preferences are not ISHARA and current incomes are correlated
with the Pareto weights. Mazzocco (2003) carries out empirical tests of these
ideas on American data, and ￿nds that the classic conditions hold for singles,
but not for couples.
If we imagine that bargaining power may change over time (in the ab-
sence of full-commitment e¢ ciency), and that preferences are ISHARA, the











where qt = qt
A+qt
B, and rt is the interest rate in period t. The intuition behind
this result is that agents decide to save more when they are faced with a new
kind of risk (due to ￿ uctuations in bargaining power).28 Mazzocco (2007)
uses these properties to test model of e¢ ciency with commitment, which is
rejected in favor of a weaker version of e¢ ciency.
One drawback is that the model does not produce any speci￿c predictions
regarding the constraints on behavior if preferences are not ISHARA. This
comes from the fact that individual consumptions are not observed. However,
28Aura (2004) obtains a similar result with a less general model.












i is the leisure of household member i in the period t. This latter can
be interpreted as an exclusive good. Appealing to a type of cm-demands,
Mazzocco (2004) then shows that, in this case, the individual Euler equations
can be recovered, and that the model can be tested.
Further empirical work has considered less general questions. Lundberg,
Startz and Stillman (2001) develop a model of the intertemporal allocation
of consumption that is particularly aimed at explaining why consumption
drops sharply at the time of retirement. Seitz (2008) builds and estimates
a dynamic model of marriage-market equilibrium in order to establish the
link between the characteristics of this market and the observed behavioral
di⁄erences between Blacks and Whites in terms of marriage, divorce and
employment.
4.5 More than Two People in the Household
It is fairly simple to generalize the preceding models to greater numbers
of decision-makers. Consider then that the household consists of N > 2
individuals, and that the members of this household have utility functions
as given by (2). Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) then show that the Pseudo-
Slutsky matrix S has to satisfy the following SNR(N-1) condition:
S = ￿ + R(N ￿ 1)
where ￿ is a negative semi-de￿nite matrix, and R(N ￿1) is a matrix of rank
N ￿1. This condition is restrictive if the number of goods is su¢ ciently high.
40Both Dauphin and Fortin (2001) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) analyze








This condition is obviously only restrictive if the number of distribution fac-
tors is greater than N. The condition is tested by Dauphin and Fortin (2001)
and Dauphin (2003) on a sample from Burkina Faso including bigamous
households, and by Kapan (2009) on Turkish data.
To conclude, Bourguignon (1999) proposes a model of consumption, with-
out price e⁄ects, in a three-person household. His main objective is to analyze
the conditions under which the mechanism of resource allocation between
household members can be recovered. Individual preferences are imagined
to be as in (3), and all goods are considered to be private.29 The decision-
making process, as in traditional models, can be decomposed into two stages.
Household members ￿rst agree on a split of the household￿ s resources between
themselves, and then maximize their utilities. In this case, and under a cer-
tain number of conditions (notably that there are both exclusive goods and
distribution factors), the derivatives of the sharing rule can be recovered.
29In fact, Bourguignon (1999) analyzes a household with two parents and one child. He
imagines that the parents hold all of the bargaining power, and are altruistic. The utility
functions are as in (4), and include as arguments, the utilities of each of the parents and
of the child. However, the analysis requires that each household member have a di⁄erent
Pareto weight. Our presentation in terms of three symmetrical individuals is thus more
appropriate.
414.6 Bargaining and Threat Points
The cooperative models that we have discussed above are in fact generaliza-
tions of more speci￿c models based on the axiomatic theory of bargaining.
These latter are typically built up from the idea that household decisions
can be represented by Nash (or Kalai-Smorodinsky) bargaining. In its most
general form, agents￿behavior is then described by the programme below:
max
qA;qB;Q
(UA(qA;qB;Q) ￿ VA) ￿ (UB(qA;qB;Q) ￿ VB) (16)
subject to the budget constraint (1), where Vi is the threat point of member
i, that is, the utility that this member would enjoy if there is no bargaining
agreement. This threat point depends in general on a variety of variables,
including the distribution factors.
The distinction between the di⁄erent bargaining models boils down to the
choice of threat point.30 Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981) imagine that this latter is represented by the individual￿ s utility in the
case of divorce.31 For example, the threat points could be written as follows:
Vi(yi;wi;ci;mi); (17)
where yi represents the income of member i after divorce, wi the wage rate,
ci the share of divorce costs that i would have to pay, and mi is an indi-
cator related to the marriage market which re￿ ects remarriage opportuni-
ties. However, imagining that the principal threat in a household is that of
divorce may seem rather excessive. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) therefore
30Ligon (2002) proposes a di⁄erent type of model, where the Nash solution is generalized
to an intertemporal framework (and the hypothesis of e¢ ciency is relaxed).
31Ott (1990) presents a certain number of extensions of this model.
42developed a model where the threat point is determined by the solution to
a non-cooperative game.32 In this model, certain types of spending belong
to the masculine sphere, and others to the feminine sphere. If the couple
decides not to cooperate, each household member will carry out the spend-
ing in their own sphere, subject to their own budget constraint. Bergstrom
(1999) attempts to unite this literature by building a model, inspired by the
foundations of non-cooperative bargaining theory (as in Rubinstein and Bin-
more), where divorce is only the ultimate threat, in the sense that the level
of utility cannot fall below that which would pertain in the case of divorce.33
The question of the empirical content of bargaining models was the sub-
ject of hot debate a number of years ago, and the following conclusions seem
to have been drawn (see Chiappori (1988b, 1991), McElroy and Horney
(1990) and McElroy (1990)). In the ￿rst instance, the demands resulting
from the programme in (16) naturally have to satisfy the conditions derived
in Section 2 as these bargaining models with symmetric information lead to
e¢ cient allocations. The problem is then the following: does the hypoth-
esis that individual behavior is described by Nash bargaining lead to any
additional constraints? This point is complicated by the fact that neither
individual preferences nor the threat points are observed by the econome-
32Chen and Woolley (2000) also propose a bargaining model where the threat points are
given by the level of utility that would be obtained in a non-cooperative game. However,
their model, perhaps surprisingly, does not yield Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes. It is therefore
di¢ cult to classify this model in the cooperative group.
33Kanbur and Haddad (1992, 1994) and Haddad and Kanbur (1992) appeal to bargain-
ing models to consider the relationship between economic growth and within-household
inequality.
43trician, and it is not even possible to estimate them on a sample of single
or divorced individuals as the concepts of utility that appear in (16) have
a cardinal dimension. However, one possible response to this question has
recently been proposed. Chiappori and Donni (2008) show that if we have
no a priori information on the threat points, then bargaining models produce
no new predictions that can be tested empirically. The underlying idea is
that any point along the Pareto frontier can be achieved by the judicious
choice of the threat points. Even so, bargaining models will yield additional
empirical content as long as preferences and threat points satisfy a particular
separability property. This is in particular the case when agents are egotis-
tical, when there are no externalities, and when the threat points are of the
type given by (17). Furthermore, under certain additional hypotheses, it is
even possible to identify the cardinal utility functions.
5 Non-cooperative Models
Non-cooperative models are based on game theory, and more speci￿cally
on Cournot-Nash equilibria. The principle here is that household members
act to maximize their own utility subject to their own budget constraint,
while taking the decisions of their partner into account. First suppose that
household income y is divided up between the household members according
to some rule, and that as a result member A receives ￿A and member B ￿B.
When preferences are as (3), and public and private goods are disjoint, the
44demands resulting from the Cournot-Nash equilibrium are given by34
max
qi;Qi
Ui(qA;QA + QB) subject to p
0qi + P
0Qi = ￿i(y;p;P;s); (18)
where Qi denotes the contribution of member i to the provision of public
goods. This presentation of the problem is similar to the decentralization of
the allocation of private goods in cooperative models. There is nonetheless
an essential di⁄erence here, in that the decentralization here simultaneously
covers both private and public goods. Consequently, the allocation of goods
that results will be ine¢ cient.35 It should be noted, however, that cooperative
and non-cooperative models will produce the same outcomes if all goods are
private and there are no externalities.
The solution of the programme (18) produces reaction functions and
solving them with respect to (qi;Qi) gives the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2009) and Ulph (2006) analyze the exis-
tence conditions of this equilibrium and the properties of the resulting de-
mand functions. The former authors show that, in general, household mem-
bers will contribute to the provision of no more than one public good. One
remarkable result, in the very case where the provision of one public good
is made by both household members, is that the demands for goods do not
depend on the initial division of exogenous income. In other words, if we
analyze the couple￿ s demands, at a given total level of income, as a function
34This speci￿cation is reminiscent of that in Carter and Katz (1997) where, before the
game starts, agents divide household income up according to what the authors call a
￿conjugal contract￿ .
35A decentralized decision-making process will lead to Pareto-e¢ cient allocations if per-
sonal prices, that is the Lindahl prices, are de￿ned in a ￿rst stage. This point was brie￿ y
mentioned in Section 4.
45of the initial split of this income, we will obtain a ￿plateau￿on which these
demands are independent of this split; in particular, the income pooling con-
dition is satis￿ed. However, for a very unequal distribution of income, one
of the members will stop contributing to the public good, and we will return
to the case where demands are indeed a function of the initial distribution of
income. This is a generalization of a well-known result in Public Economics
due to Warr (1983), Kemp (1984) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1988).
This conclusion also applies, mutatis mutandis, to cooperative models in
which the non-cooperative outcome acts as the threat point.
While one of the conditions that characterizes the unitary model, that
is the aggregation of income, is satis￿ed by the goods demands that result
from the non-cooperative model, the symmetry condition in general is not.
Considering the special case where ￿i(y;p;P;s) = yi, where yi is the income
of member i, Ulph (2006) has shown that the Pseudo-Slutsky matrix will
be symmetric in the special case where preferences depend only on public
goods or the endowment of household members is very unequal. Lechene
and Preston (2009) show that, in general, if the number of public goods is
equal to M and the number of private goods is su¢ ciently large, the Pseudo-
Slutsky matrix S satis￿es the following condition:
S = ￿ + R(M + 1);
where R(M +1) is a matrix of rank M +1. As such, the price e⁄ects have to
satisfy a certain restriction, but this latter is weaker than that which pertains
in cooperative models.
The non-cooperative framework has also been applied to labor supply.
Donni (2006) considers a fairly general form of preferences, which are as
46follows:
Ui(lA;lB;qA;qB); (19)
where li denotes the leisure of member i and qi their consumption; these
variables create an externality on the well-being of the individual￿ s partner.
In this general model, as there are no public goods, strictly speaking, the
distribution factors may a⁄ect household behavior. However, if stronger
hypotheses on preferences are adopted, then the empirical content of the
model is considerably richer. For example, Ulph (1981) and Kooreman and
Kapteyn (1990) estimate the labor supplies which result from preferences of
the following type:
Ui(lA;lB;QA + QB):
In this case, the presence of public consumption implies that the aggregation
condition of income is satis￿ed and the initial division of income will have no
e⁄ect on outcomes. Some elements of individual preferences can equally be
recovered. More precisely, the general solution for the preferences of member
i, as a function of the labor supplies, is given by:
F (Ui(lA;lB;Q);li);
where Ui(lA;lB;q) is a particular solution and F(￿) is a positive function of
Ui. Leuthold (1968), in what is very likely the ￿rst article on ￿formal￿non-
unitary models, considers another special case and supposes that preferences
are given by:
Ui(li;QA + QB):
47The drawback of this speci￿cation is that it is not possible to take into ac-
count any complementarity or substitutability between the leisure of di⁄erent
household members. Other labor supply models where consumption is partly
public and partly private are proposed by Bourguignon (1984).
To conclude, it should be noted that many household decisions are an-
alyzed in a non-cooperative framework. Bjorn and Vuong (1984, 1997) and
Kooreman (1994) adapt non-cooperative models of labor supply to discrete
choices,36 while Konrad and Lommerud (1995) and Carter and Katz (1997)
concentrate on domestic production. Konrad and Lommerud (2000) analyze
over-investment in human capital in both cooperative and non-cooperative
models. This list is far from being exhaustive.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we have seen that non-unitary models of household behavior
can be split up into two broad categories. The ￿rst includes non-cooperative
(or strategic) models, which are based on Cournot-Nash equilibria, and the
second cooperative (or collective) models which only posit the Pareto e¢ -
ciency of allocations. Recent research appears to have shown, nonetheless,
that the interactions between these two categories of model are increasingly
important. As we have seen, cooperative models which are based on bar-
gaining theory sometimes use the utility levels that would prevail under a
non-cooperative game between household members as threat points. Further,
the analysis of intertemporal choice models has often led to the abandon of
36They also consider models based on Stackelberg equilibria.
48the hypothesis of Pareto-e¢ ciency. On the one hand, Pollak and Lundberg
(1994) have become the advocates of a more general model, based on re-
peated games and which often exhibits a number of di⁄erent Cournot-Nash
equilibria. Some of these equilibria are e¢ cient, but others are not, and the
choice between the di⁄erent equilibria is determined by cultural factors. On
the other hand, Kaushik Basu, Ethan Legon, Stephen Lich-Tyler, Maurizio
Mazzoco, in addition to a number of other authors, whose work was discussed
in Sections 4.3 et 4.4, emphasize that Pareto e¢ ciency is more di¢ cult to
justify in an intertemporal context. If household members are not able to
pre-commit contractually, changes in the opportunities that become open
to them over time will yield changes in negotiating power, and thus inef-
￿ciency. The analysis of household behavior in this framework constitutes
vast research program.
Recent work has also moved towards the use of collective models in eco-
nomic policy. For example, Lise and Seitz (2008) consider the distribution of
income, both between and within households. Laisney (eds, 2006) discusses
an ambitious research project the objective of which is to analyze the ef-
fects of ￿scal reform on labor supply. On this score, empirical models which
are based only on Pareto e¢ ciency raise a certain number of problems: as
they do not explicitly specify the threat points of household members, nor
the type of bargain which underlies outcomes, they are not strictly speaking
structural models. In other words, the form of the sharing rule cannot be
explained by these models. A substantial degree of caution is therefore re-
quired if we wish to use the results of this analysis to simulate the e⁄ects of
economic policy. An example may help to make this point clearer. As we saw
49above, Marjorie McElroy and Mary-Jane Horney choose the level of utility
that household members would obtain when divorced as the threat point.
One implication of this hypothesis is that any change in the identity of the
bene￿ciary of family support will have no e⁄ect on household behavior (as
family support automatically goes to the individual who keeps the children
in the case of divorce). Alternatively, Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak
suppose that the threat point is determined by the levels of utility that each
household member would obtain if they were to carry out the tasks that are
traditionally assigned to their gender. In this case, a change in the bene￿-
ciary of family support will likely a⁄ect the distribution of resources within
the household. In other words, empirical analysis based on Pareto e¢ ciency
can yield diverse predictions with respect to behavior, because there is no
theory to determine the sharing rule. The solution to this problem is likely
found in the use of richer data in which we are able to observe exogenous
changes in both the amount of child bene￿ts and other family support and
the way in which these are allocated within the family, or in the development
of more restrictive theoretical models which also explain the distribution of
resources within the household. This constitutes one of the main challenges
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